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Compiler correctness is, in its simplest form, defined as the inclusion of the set of traces of the compiled
program into the set of traces of the original program, which is equivalent to the preservation of all trace
properties. Here traces collect, for instance, the externally observable events of each execution. This definition
requires, however, the set of traces of the source and target languages to be exactly the same, which is not
the case when the languages are far apart or when observations are fine grained. To overcome this issue,
we study a generalized compiler correctness definition, which uses source and target traces drawn from
potentially different sets and connected by an arbitrary relation. We set out to understand what guarantees
this generalized compiler correctness definition gives us when instantiated with a non-trivial relation on
traces. When this trace relation is not equality, it is no longer possible to preserve the trace properties of
the source program unchanged. Instead, we provide a generic characterization of the target trace property
ensured by correctly compiling a program that satisfies a given source property, and dually, of the source trace
property one is required to show in order to obtain a certain target property for the compiled code. We show
that this view on compiler correctness can naturally account for undefined behavior, resource exhaustion,
different source and target values, side-channels, and various abstraction mismatches. Finally, we show that
the same generalization also applies to a large class of secure compilation definitions, which characterize the
protection of a compiled program against linked adversarial code.
1 INTRODUCTION
Compiler correctness is an old idea [28, 30, 31] that has seen a significant revival in the recent
past. This new wave was started by the creation of the CompCert verified C compiler [25] and
continued by the proposal of many significant extensions and variants of CompCert [7, 13, 21, 22,
32, 42, 47, 49, 53] and the success of many other milestone compiler verification projects, including
Vellvm [54], Pilsner [33], CakeML [50], Jasmin [5], CertiCoq [6], etc. Yet, even for these verified
compilers, the precise statement of correctness matters. Since proof assistants are used to conduct
the verification, an external observer does not have to understand the proofs in order to trust them,
but one still has to deeply understand the statement that was proved. And this is true not just
for correct compilation, but also for secure compilation, which is the more recent idea that our
compilation chains should do more to also ensure the security of our programs [4, 16].
Basic Compiler Correctness. The gold standard for compiler correctness is semantic preservation,
which intuitively says that the semantics of a compiled program (in the target language) is com-
patible with the semantics of the original program (in the source language). For practical verified
compilers, such as CompCert [25] and CakeML [50], semantic preservation is stated extrinsically,
by referring to traces. A trace is an ordered sequence of events—such as inputs from and outputs to
an external environment—that are produced by the execution of a program.
A basic definition of compiler correctness can be given by the set inclusion of the traces of the
compiled program into the traces of the original program, which can be formally written as [25]:
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Definition 1.1 (Basic Compiler Correctness). A compiler ↓ is correct iff
∀W t . W↓⇝t ⇒ W⇝t
This definition says that for any whole1 source program W, if we compile it (denoted W↓),
execute it with respect to the semantics of the target language, and observe a trace t , then the
original W can produce the same trace t with respect to the semantics of the source language.2
This definition is simple and easy to understand, since it only references a few familiar concepts: a
compiler between a source and a target language, each equipped with a trace-producing semantics.
Beyond Basic Compiler Correctness. This basic compiler correctness definition assumes that any
trace produced by a compiled program can be produced by the source program. This is a very strict
requirement, and in particular implies that the source and target traces are drawn from the same
set and that the same source trace corresponds to a given target trace. These assumptions are often
too strong, and hence verified compiler efforts use different formulations of compiler correctness:
CompCert [25] The original compiler correctness theorem of CompCert [25] could be seen as an
instance of basic compiler correctness, but it did not provide any guarantees for programs
that can exhibit undefined behavior [43]. As allowed by the C standard, such unsafe programs
were not even considered to be in the source language, so were not quantified over. This
has important practical implications, since undefined behavior often leads to exploitable
security vulnerabilities [8, 14, 15] and serious confusion even among experienced C and C++
developers [24, 43, 51, 52]. As such, since 2010, CompCert provides an additional top-level
correctness theorem3 that better accounts for the presence of unsafe programs by providing
guarantees for them up to the point when they encounter undefined behavior [43]. This
new theorem goes beyond the basic correctness definition above, as a target trace need only
correspond to a source trace up to the occurrence of undefined behavior in the source trace.
CakeML [50] Compiler correctness for CakeML accounts for memory exhaustion in target exe-
cutions. Crucially, memory exhaustion events cannot occur in source traces, only in target
traces. Hence, dually to CompCert, compiler correctness only requires source and target
traces to coincide up to the occurrence of a memory exhaustion event in the target trace.
Trace-Relating Compiler Correctness. Generalized formalizations of compiler correctness like the
two ones above can be naturally expressed as instances of a uniform definition, which we call
trace-relating compiler correctness. This generalizes basic compiler correctness by (a) considering
that source and target traces belong to possibly-distinct sets TraceS and TraceT, and (b) being
parameterized by an arbitrary trace relation ∼ ⊆ TraceS × TraceT.
Definition 1.2 (Trace-Relating Compiler Correctness (CC∼)). A compiler ↓ is correct with respect
to a trace relation ∼ ⊆ TraceS × TraceT iff
∀W.∀t. W↓⇝t ⇒∃s ∼ t. W⇝s
This definition requires that for any target trace t produced by the compiled program W↓, there
exists a source trace s that can be produced by the original program W and is related to t according
to ∼ (i.e. s ∼ t). By choosing the trace relation appropriately, one can recover the different notions
of compiler correctness presented above:
Basic CC Take s ∼ t to be s = t. Trivially, the basic CC of Definition 1.1 corresponds to CC=.
1To keep things simple for now we ignore separate compilation and linking, returning to it in §5.
2 As a typesetting convention, we use a blue, sans-serif font for source elements and an orange, bold font for target ones.
Elements common to both languages are typeset in a black, italic font.
3 Stated at the top of the CompCert file driver/Complements.v and discussed by Regehr [43].
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CompCert Undefined behavior is modeled in CompCert as a trace-terminating eventGoes_wronд
that can occur in any of the languages (source, target, and all intermediate languages), so for
a given (composition of) phase(s), we have TraceS = TraceT. But the relation between source
and target traces with which to instantiate CC∼ to obtain CompCert’s current theorem is:
s ∼ t ⇐⇒ s = t ∨ (∃m ≤ t. s =m·Goes_wronд)
A compiler satisfying CC∼ for this specific trace relation can turn a source trace ending in
undefined behaviorm·Goes_wronд (where “·” is concatenation) either into the same trace in
the target (first disjunct), or into a target trace that starts with the prefixm but then continues
arbitrarily (second disjunct, where “≤” is the prefix relation).
CakeML Here, target traces are sequences of symbols from an alphabet ΣT that has an additional
trace-terminating event, Resource_limit_hit, which is not available in the source alphabet
ΣS (formally ΣT = ΣS ∪ {Resource_limit_hit}). Then, the compiler correctness theorem of
CakeML can be obtained by instantiating CC∼ with the following ∼ relation:
s ∼ t ⇐⇒ s = t ∨ (∃m.m ≤ s. t =m·Resource_limit_hit)
The resulting CC∼ instance relates a target trace ending with Resource_limit_hit after exe-
cutingm to a source trace that first producesm and then continues in a way given by the
semantics of the source program.
Beyond undefined behavior and resource exhaustion, there are many other practical uses for
CC∼: in this paper we show that it also allows for accounting differences between source and target
values, for a single source output being turned into a series of target outputs, and for side-channels.
On the flip side, the compiler correctness statement and its implications can be more difficult
to understand for CC∼ than for CC=. The full implications of choosing a particular ∼ relation
can be subtle. In fact, using a bad relation can make the compiler correctness statement trivial or
unexpected. For instance, it should be easy to see that if one uses the full relation, which relates all
source traces to all target ones, the CC∼ property holds for every compiler, yet it might take one a
bit more effort to understand that the same is true even for the following relation:
s ∼ t ⇐⇒ ∃W.W⇝s ∧ W↓⇝t
Reasoning About Trace Properties. To understand more about a particular CC∼ instance, we
propose to also look at how it preserves trace properties—defined as sets of allowed traces [23]—from
the source to the target. For instance, it is well-known that CC= is equivalent to the preservation of
all trace properties (whereW |= π stands for ∀t .W⇝t ⇒ t ∈ π ):
CC= ⇐⇒ ∀π ∈ 2Trace ∀W. W|=π ⇒ W↓|=π
But to the best of our knowledge, similar results have not been formulated for trace relations
beyond equality, when it is no longer possible to preserve the trace properties of the source
program unchanged. For trace-relating compiler correctness, where source and target traces can
be drawn from different sets, and related by an arbitrary trace relation, there are two important
questions to ask:
(1) Given a source trace propertyπS of a program—established for instance by formal verification—
what is the strongest target property that any CC∼ compiler is guaranteed to ensure for the
produced target program?
(2) Given a target trace property πT , what is the weakest source property we need to show of
the original source program for obtaining πT for the result of any CC∼ compiler?
In this work we provide a simple and general answer to these questions, for any instance of CC∼.
We observe that any trace relation ∼ induces two property mappings τ˜ and σ˜ , which are simple
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functions mapping source properties to target ones (τ˜ standing for “to target”) and target properties
to source ones (σ˜ standing for “to source”):
τ˜ (πS) = {t | ∃s. s ∼ t ∧ s ∈ πS} σ˜ (πT ) = {s | ∀t. s ∼ t ⇒ t ∈ πT }
τ˜ answers the first question above by mapping a given source property πS to the target property
that contains all target traces for which there exists a related source trace that satisfies πS. Dually, σ˜
answers the second question by mapping a given target property πT to the source property that
contains all source traces for which all related target traces satisfy πT . Formally, we show that τ˜
and σ˜ form a Galois connection and introduce two new correct compilation definitions in terms of
trace property preservation (TP): TPτ˜ quantifies over all source trace properties and uses τ˜ to obtain
the corresponding target properties. TPσ˜ quantifies over all target trace properties and uses σ˜ to
obtain the corresponding source properties. We prove that these two definitions are equivalent to
CC∼, yielding a novel trinitarian view of compiler correctness, illustrated in Figure 1.
CC∼
TPσ˜TPτ˜
∀W.∀t. W↓⇝t ⇒∃s ∼ t. W⇝s
∀πT . ∀W. W |= σ˜ (πT )
⇒ W↓ |= πT ≡ ≡
∀πS. ∀W. W |= πS
⇒ W↓ |= τ˜ (πS)
≡
Fig. 1. The three equivalent definitions of compiler correctness that form our trinitarian view.
Contributions
▶ We propose a new trinitarian view of compiler correctness that accounts for a non-trivial
relation between source and target traces. While, as discussed above, specific instances of the
CC∼ definition have already been used in practice, we seem to be the first to propose assessing
the meaningfulness of CC∼ instances in terms of how properties are preserved between the
source and the target, and in particular by looking at the property mappings σ˜ and τ˜ induced by
the trace relation ∼. We prove that CC∼, TPσ˜ , and TPτ˜ are equivalent for any trace relation, as
illustrated in Figure 1 (§2.3). In the opposite direction, we show that any property mappings
that form a Galois connection induce a trace relation so that an analogous equivalence holds
(§2.4). Finally, we extend these results from the preservation of trace properties to the larger
class of subset-closed hyperproperties (§2.5), which includes for instance noninterference.
▶ We use example CC∼ compilers of different complexity to illustrate that this view on compiler
correctness can naturally account for undefined behavior (§3.1), for resource exhaustion (§3.2),
for different source and target values (§3.3), for a single source output being turned into a series
of target outputs (§3.4), and for target traces that contain extra side-channel observations that
could leak secret information (§3.5). We expect these ideas to apply to any other discrepancies
between source and target traces. For each example compiler we show how to choose the relation
between source and target traces and how the induced property mappings preserve interesting
trace properties and subset-closed hyperproperties. We look not only at general hyperproperty
classes, such as safety and abstract noninterference, but also at individual properties, and the
way particular σ˜ and τ˜ work on different kinds of properties and how the produced property
can be expressed for different kinds of traces.
▶ We apply the idea of mapping between source and target properties to two other property
classes (§4). One the one hand, one can weaken compiler correctness to preserving just the
safety properties of the source or of the target language. On the other hand, one can strengthen
compiler correctness to preserving arbitrary hyperproperties, even ones that are not subset
closed, which prevents refinement of nondeterminism.
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▶ Finally, we show that the trinitarian view also extends to a large class of secure compilation
definitions, formally characterizing the protection of the compiled program against linked
adversarial code (§5). For each secure compilation definition we again propose both a property-
free characterization in the style ofCC∼, and two characterizations in terms of preserving a class
of source or target properties satisfied against arbitrary adversarial contexts. The additional
quantification over contexts allows for finer distinctions when considering different property
classes, so we study mapping classes not only of trace properties and hyperproperties, but also
of relational hyperproperties [2]. An example secure compiler accounting for a target that can
produce additional observations that are not possible in the source illustrates this approach.
The paper closes with discussions of related (§6) and future work (§7). The appendix contains a
few omitted technical details. Most of the theorems formally or informally mentioned in the
paper were also mechanized in the Coq proof assistant and are marked with ; this devel-
opment has around 10k lines of code and is available https://github.com/secure-compilation/
exploring-robust-property-preservation/tree/different_traces
2 TRACE-RELATING COMPILER CORRECTNESS
In this section, we start by generalizing the trace property preservation definitions from the end
of the introduction to TPσ and TPτ , which depend on two arbitrary mappings σ and τ (§2.1). We
prove that whenever σ and τ form a Galois connection TPσ and TPτ are equivalent (§2.2). Since
σ˜ and τ˜ form a Galois connection, we use the general result above to show that TPσ˜ and TPτ˜
are equivalent, which we then use to prove that any relation ∼ induces σ˜ and τ˜ that makes the
trinitarian equivalence of Figure 1 hold (§2.3). This helps us assess the meaningfulness of a given
trace relation, by looking at the property mappings it induces. We also prove a dual result: for any σ
and τ forming a Galois connection we can define a trace relation so that the trinitarian equivalence
holds (§2.4). This allows us to obtain the right trace relation if we want to ensure some particular
property mappings. Finally, we generalize the classic result that compiler correctness (e.g., CC=) is
enough to preserve not just trace properties but also all subset-closed hyperproperties [9]. For this
we show that CC∼ is also equivalent to subset-closed hyperproperty preservation, for which we
also define both a version in terms of σ˜ and a version in terms of τ˜ (§2.5).
2.1 Property Mappings
As mentioned in the introduction, trace-relating compiler correctness CC∼, by itself, lacks a crisp
description of which trace properties are preserved by compilation. Since even the syntax of traces
can differ between source and target one can either look at trace properties of the source, but
then one needs to interpret them in the target, or at trace properties of the target, but then one
needs to interpret them in the source. The first interpretation could answer the following question:
What guarantees does one obtain when compiling a verified C program that does not encounter an
undefined behavior to machine code (§3.1)? The second interpretation could tell us what condition
in the source prevents a compiled program from failing with an out of memory violation (§3.2).
Formally, these two interpretations can be seen as two property mappings:
τ : 2TraceS → 2TraceT σ : 2TraceT → 2TraceS
For an arbitrary source program W, τ interprets a source property πS as the target guarantee for
W↓. Dually, σ defines a source obligation sufficient for the satisfaction of a target property πT after
compilation. To stay coherent with this informal interpretation, some extra conditions on τ and σ
seem natural (and as we will see in §2.2, also formally useful):
• First, the source property obtained by applying σ to the guarantee obtained by interpreting
πS in the target (via τ ), should be weaker than πS itself, i.e. σ (τ (πS)) ⊇ πS.
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• Dually, the target property obtained via τ from the source obligation (via σ ) for a target
property πT , should actually ensure that πT holds, i.e. τ (σ (πT )) ⊆ πT .
These two conditions on τ and σ are satisfied exactly when the two maps form a Galois connection
between the posets of source and target properties ordered by inclusion.
Let us first recall the definition and the characteristic property of Galois connections [11, 29].
Definition 2.1 (Galois connection). Let (X , ≤) and (Y ,⊑) be two posets. A pair of maps, α : X → Y ,
γ : Y → X is a Galois connection iff it satisfies the following adjunction law:
∀x ∈ X . ∀y ∈ Y . α(x) ⊑ y ⇐⇒ x ≤ γ (y)
α is referred to as the lower adjoint and γ as the upper adjoint. We will often write
α : (X , ≤)⇆ (Y ,⊑) : γ
to denote a Galois connection, and simply α : X ⇆ Y : γ when X and Y are powersets and the
considered order is set inclusion, and even α ⇆ γ when the involved sets are clear from context.
Lemma 2.2 (Characteristic property of Galois connections). If α : (X , ≤)⇆ (Y ,⊑) : γ is a Galois
connection, then α ,γ are monotone and they satisfy the following properties:
i) ∀x ∈ X . x ≤ γ (α(x)) ii) ∀y ∈ Y . α(γ (y)) ⊑ y
For X ,Y complete lattices it is possible to show that α is continuous, i.e. ∀F ⊆ X . α(⊔ F ) = ⊔ α(F )
The two characteristic properties of Galois connections coincide with the conditions on property
mappings introduced above, taking X to be source properties, Y to be target properties, α to be τ , γ
to be and σ , and the order to be set inclusion; i.e. σ (τ (πS)) ⊇ πS and τ (σ (πT )) ⊆ πT .
Perhaps surprisingly, the property mapping to the target (τ ) corresponds to the abstraction
function α , while the property mapping to the source (σ ) corresponds to the concretization function
γ . The explanation is that the definition of trace properties 2Trace is contravariant in Trace, so while
traces get more concrete when moving to the target, trace properties get, well, more abstract.
2.2 Revisiting Trace Properties Preservation
We can now generalize trace properties preservation (TP), relying on an interpretation of source
properties in the target and target ones in the source.
Definition 2.3 (TPσ and TPτ ). Given two trace property mappings, τ : 2TraceS → 2TraceT and
σ : 2TraceT → 2TraceS , for a compilation chain ·↓ we define:
TPτ ≡ ∀πS. ∀W. W |= πS ⇒ W↓ |= τ (πS) TPσ ≡ ∀πT . ∀W. W |= σ (πT ) ⇒ W↓ |= πT
Note that, by uniqueness of adjoints [29], given a τ , there exists a unique σ such that they form
a Galois connection (and vice-versa). Here, this means that if one is designing a compiler whose
correctness goal is to ensure preservation of source properties according to a given mapping τ , then
there is a unique corresponding property mapping σ from target properties to source properties
(and vice-versa). This suggests that, for any two property mappings defining a Galois connection,
TPτ and TPτ are equivalent.
Theorem 2.4 (TPτ and TPσ coincide). Let τ : 2TraceS ⇄ 2TraceT : σ be a Galois connection, where
τ is the lower adjoint and σ is the upper adjoint. Then TPτ ⇐⇒ TPσ .
Proof. ( ) See Corollary Adj_σTP_iff_τTP in NonRobustDefs.v. In general, if a program satis-
fies a property π , then it satisfies every extension π ′ ⊇ π . Using this, the theorem follows by:
(⇒) Assume TPτ and that W satisfies σ (πT ). Apply TPτ to W and σ (πT ) and deduce that W↓
satisfies τ (σ (πT )) ⊆ πT .
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(⇐) Assume RTPσ and that W satisfies πS ⊆ σ (τ (πS)). Apply TPσ to W and σ (τ (πS)) deducing
W↓ satisfies τ (πS). □
We now investigate the relation between CC∼ and TPτ and TPσ . In §2.3, we show that starting
from a given trace relation ∼, it is always possible to define two property mappings τ˜ , σ˜ so that
the three criteria are all equivalent (Theorem 2.7). In §2.4 we show that, dually, given a Galois
connection τ ⇄ σ it is possible to define a relation that still ensures the equivalence (Theorem 2.10).
2.3 From Trace Relations to Property Mappings
Definition 2.5 (Induced property mappings). Given an arbitrary trace relation∼ ⊆ TraceS×TraceT,
we define its induced property mappings τ˜ and σ˜ as explained in the introduction:
τ˜ = λ πS. {t | ∃s. s ∼ t ∧ s ∈ πS} σ˜ = λ πT . {s | ∀t. s ∼ t ⇒ t ∈ πT }
These induced property mappings indeed form a Galois connection.
Theorem 2.6 (Induced adjunction). τ˜ ⇆ σ˜ is a Galois connection between the sets of trace
properties of source and target traces ordered by set inclusion.
Proof. ( ) See Lemma induced_adj_law in Galois.v. □
We denote by TPτ˜ , TPσ˜ the criteria in Definition 2.3 for τ˜ and σ˜ respectively. Theorem 2.7 below
states the equivalence of TPτ˜ , CC∼ and TPσ˜ .
Theorem 2.7 (TPτ˜ , CC∼, TPσ˜ coincide). For any trace relation ∼ and induced property mappings
τ˜ and σ˜ (Definition 2.5), we have that
TPτ˜ ⇐⇒ CC∼ ⇐⇒ TPσ˜
Proof. ( ) See Theorems rel_TC_τTP and rel_TC_σTP in NonRobustTraceCriterion.v, where
the TPτ˜ ⇐⇒ TPσ˜ part follows directly from Theorem 2.4. □
It follows that, for a CC∼ compiler, σ˜ provides the source proof obligation ensuring a certain
target property holds, and τ˜ provides the target guarantee of a compiled program every time a
property holds for the source program. Note that, as we will see with concrete instances in §3, in
some specific settings the lifted properties may be simply impossible to satisfy.
2.4 From Property Mappings to Trace Relations
A compiler designer might start by first determining the target guarantees (τ ), and then aim at
showing TPτ , which can, however, be challenging to prove directly. This section shows that, given
a Galois connection between source and target properties, we can define a trace relation ∼ that
ensures the equivalence between CC∼, TPτ , and TPσ . Consequently, instead of proving TPτ directly,
it is sufficient to prove CC∼, for which convenient proof techniques exist in the literature [25].
Definition 2.8 (Induced trace relation (∼ˆ)). Given a Galois connection τ : 2TraceS ⇆ 2TraceT : σ , we
define the induced trace relation ∼ˆ ⊆ TraceS × TraceT so that the target guarantee for πS, τ (πS)
coincides with the image of the relation on the same πS.
s ∼ˆ t ⇐⇒ t ∈ τ ({s})
Notice that σ does not appear in the definition, but it is uniquely defined by being the upper
adjoint of τ [29], so ∼ˆ depends on both τ and σ .
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Lemma 2.9 (Involutive lemma ). Let τ : 2TraceS ⇆ 2TraceT : σ be a Galois connection and let ∼ˆ be
their induced trace relation (Definition 2.8). Let τˆ : 2TraceS ⇆ 2TraceT : σˆ be the Galois connection
induced by ∼ˆ (Definition 2.5), then the two Galois connections coincide:
(i) ∀πS. τ (πS) = τˆ (πS) (ii) ∀πT . σ (πT ) = σˆ (πT )
Proof. The proof mainly relies on continuity of τ (see Lemma 2.2). In particular for πS ∈ 2TraceS
we have τ (πS) = ⋃s∈πS τ ({s}). So that for an arbitrary πS ∈ 2TraceS ,
τˆ (πS) = {t | ∃s ∈ πS. s∼ˆt} = {t | ∃s ∈ πS. t ∈ τ ({s})} =
⋃
s∈πS
τ ({s}) = τ (πS)
(ii) is an immediate consequence of the (well-known) uniqueness of the upper adjoint [29]. □
Theorem 2.10 (TPτ , CC ∼ˆ, and TPσ all coincide). Given a Galois connection τ ⇄ σ between
property mappings, and their induced trace relation ∼ˆ (Definition 2.8), we have:
TPτ ⇐⇒ CC ∼ˆ ⇐⇒ TPσ
Proof. By Lemma 2.9, τ and σ coincide pointwise with the upper and lower adjoint induced by
the relation ∼ˆ. The result then follows by Theorem 2.7. □
2.5 Preservation of Subset-Closed Hyperproperties
A CC= compilation chain ensures the preservation of not only trace properties but also all subset-
closed hyperproperties, as this class of hyperproperties is known to be preserved by refinement [9].
An example of a subset-closed hyperproperty is noninterference [9], and a CC= compiler guarantees
that if W is noninterfering with respect to the inputs and outputs in the trace then so is W↓. We
will go back to noninterference for the trace-changing setting in §3.5; but to be able to talk about
properties such as noninterference here we propose another trinitarian view involving CC∼ and
preservation of subset-closed hyperproperties (Theorem 2.13).
First of all recall that a program satisfies a hyperproperty when its complete set of traces, which
from now on we will call its behavior, is a member of the hyperproperty [9].
Definition 2.11 (Hyperproperty Satisfaction). A programW satisfies a hyperproperty H , written
W |= H ,if and only if beh(W ) ∈ H , where beh(W ) = {t | W⇝t}.
Hyperproperty preservation is a strong requirement in general. Fortunately many interesting
hyperproperties are subset-closed (SCH for short), which simplifies preservation of such hyperprop-
erties, since it suffices to show that the behaviors of the compiled program refine the behaviors of
the source one, which coincides with the statement of CC=.
In the trace-relating setting, to talk about hyperproperty preservation, we need an interpretation
of source hyperproperties into the target and vice-versa. The one we consider builds on top of the
two property mappings τ and σ , which are naturally lifted to hyperproperty mappings. This way
we are able to extract two hyperproperty mappings from a trace relation similarly to §2.3.
Definition 2.12 (Lifting property mappings to hyperproperty mappings). Let τ : 2TraceS → 2TraceT
and σ : 2TraceT → 2TraceS be arbitrary property mappings. The images of HS ∈ 22TraceS ,HT ∈ 22TraceT
under τ and σ respectively are:
τ (HS) = {τ (πS) | πS ∈ HS} σ (HT) = {σ (πT ) | πT ∈ HT}
Formally we are defining two new mappings, on hyperproperties, but with a small abuse of
notation we still denote them by τ and σ .
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Interestingly, it is not possible to use the same argument used for CC= to show that a CC∼
compilation chain guarantees W↓ |= τ˜ (HS) whenever W |= HS. The proof breaks as the target
hyperproperty τ˜ (HS) is not necessarily subset-closed, even if the original hyperproperty HS was.
In the following theorem we consider the loss of precision, due to the two interpretations of
hyperproperties, and close τ˜ (HS) under subsets (and similarly for σ˜ ).
Theorem 2.13 (Preservation of Subset-Closed Hyperproperties). For any trace relation ∼ and
induced hyperproperty mappings τ˜ and σ˜ , we have:
SCHPCl⊆◦τ˜ ⇐⇒ CC∼ ⇐⇒ SCHPCl⊆◦σ˜
where Cl⊆(H ) = {π | ∃π ′ ∈ H . π ⊆ π ′} and
SCHPCl⊆◦τ˜ ≡ ∀W∀HS ∈ SCHS.W |= HS ⇒ W↓ |= Cl⊆(τ˜ (HS))
SCHPCl⊆◦σ˜ ≡ ∀W∀HT ∈ SCHT.W |= Cl⊆(σ˜ (HT)) ⇒ W↓ |= HT
Proof. ( ) rel_TC_sClτSCHP, rel_TC_sCl_σRSCHP in NonRobustSSCHCriterion.v. □
In conclusion,CC∼ can also be used to reason about the preservation of subset-closed hyperprop-
erties, but one has to be aware of the potential loss of precision introduced by the subset closure.
We illustrate this in §3.5 when considering the preservation of noninterference in a CC∼ compiler
to a target language with additional low-level observations.
3 INSTANCES OF TRACE-RELATING COMPILER CORRECTNESS
The trace-relating view of compiler correctness introduced in §2 can function as a unifying frame-
work and studying a range of interesting and realistic compilers. This section provides several
representative instantiations of the framework: source languages with undefined behavior that can
turn by compilation into arbitrary behavior (§3.1), target languages with resource exhaustion that
cannot happen in the source (§3.2), changes in the representation of values (§3.3), differences in the
granularity of data and observable events (§3.4), and increased observational power of physical
resources such as time in the target and its effects on noninterference (§3.5).
3.1 Undefined Behavior
In this section, we expand upon the discussion of undefined behavior from §1.
Old unsafe source languages, such as C and C++, focus so much on performance that they admit
so called undefined behavior: for historical reasons and since providing a sane behavior for all
programs would be too expensive (e.g., would require checking bounds on arrays), parts of the
semantics of these languages are left unspecified. As explained previously, programs exhibiting any
such behavior have no semantics according to the standards. Hence, one standard-compliant option
is to discard these programs as “unsafe”, and say that compiler correctness only applies to “safe”
programs [25]. However, this is unsatisfying: many real-world programs have undefined behavior,
which often leads to exploitable security vulnerabilities. A slightly saner view of undefined behavior
is to see it as an event that happens during execution. After it happens, the compiled program
is allowed to behave in a completely arbitrary manner, but until that happens the program still
receives compiler correctness guarantees.
One of CompCert’s correctness theorem states exactly this (in file driver/Complements.v):
Every behavior of the generated assembly code is matched by a behavior of the
source C code. The behavior beh of the assembly code is either identical to the
behavior beh’ of the source C code or “improves upon” beh’ by replacing a
“going wrong” behavior with a more defined behavior.
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In the following, we describe how we can capture such a theorem in our framework. We consider
two variants: in the first one (Example 3.1), we stick to CompCert, where the source and target
alphabets are the same, including the undefined behavior event. In this case, the relation allows
relaxing equality by potentially replacing undefined behavior with any sequence of events. In
the second case (Example 3.2), we observe that, at levels low enough, such as machine code, the
language often has no undefined behavior. However, at such levels, machine instructions that are
never used by the compiler can produce new events that are not modeled in the source.
Example 3.1 (CompCert’s Relation). Source and target traces are sequences of events drawn
from Σ, where Goes_wronд ∈ Σ. The symbol Goes_wronд is a terminal event that represents an
undefined behavior. We recall the trace relation for undefined behavior from the introduction:
s ∼ t ⇐⇒ s = t ∨ ∃m ≤ t. s =m ·Goes_wronд
This captures the intuition above in the following way: a compiler satisfyingCC∼ produces compiled
programs for which each trace can be explained in one of the two following ways:
• it can also be produced by the source program; or
• there exists a finite prefix of this trace that is produced by the source program, immediately
followed by an undefined behavior.
CompCert is verified to satisfy this variant of CC∼.
Trace properties. We proved that the two property mappings induced by the relation can be
written as follows ( , file UndefBehaviorCompCert.v):
σ˜ (πT ) = {s | s ∈ πT ∧ s ,m ·Goes_wronд} ∪ {m ·Goes_wronд | ∀t,m ≤ t =⇒ t ∈ πT }
τ˜ (πS) = {t | t ∈ πS} ∪ {t | ∃m ≤ t.m ·Goes_wronд ∈ πS}
These two mappings explain what a CC∼ compiler ensures for the ∼ relation above:
• The target-to-source mapping σ˜ states that to prove that a compiled program has a property πT
using source-level reasoning, one has to prove that any trace produced by the source programmust
either be a target trace satisfying πT or have undefined behavior provided that any continuation
of the trace immediately prior to the undefined behavior satisfies πT .
• The source-to-target mapping τ˜ states that by compiling a program satisfying a property πS we
obtain a program that produces traces that satisfy the same property or that extend a source
trace that ends in undefined behavior.
These definitions can help us reason about programs. For instance, σ˜ specifies that, to prove
that an event does not happen in the target, it is not enough to prove that it does not happen in
the source: it is also necessary to prove that the source program is safe, i.e. it does not have any
undefined behavior (second disjunct). Indeed, if it had an undefined behavior, one of its continuation
would exhibit the unwanted event, and so would not be in the property. The τ˜ map clarifies that if
undefined behavior can happen in the source, nothing can be said about target traces after that
point: the undefined behavior could indeed be replaced by anything (second disjunct). 
Example 3.2 (Going to machine code). We now consider a more realistic setting, in which we
reached a low-level language like machine code, whose semantics is often fully defined. On the one
hand, the target traces can no longer exhibit undefined behavior. On the other hand, the target
traces can also contain new events that cannot occur in the source: indeed, modern architecture
like x86 often have a lot more instructions that what a compiler uses. Some of them might even
perform dangerous operations, such as writing to the hard drive. Formally, the source and target do
not have the same events anymore. We consider a source alphabet ΣS = Σ ∪ {Goes_wrong}, and a
target alphabet ΣT = Σ ∪ Σ′, with no undefined behavior in Σ′.
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The trace relation is defined in the same way and we obtain the same property mappings as above,
except that since target traces now have more events, some of which dangerous, the fact that the
target traces continue in arbitrary ways gets more interesting. For instance, consider a new event
that represents writing data on the hard drive, and suppose we want to prove that this event cannot
happen for their compiled program. If the source program cannot exhibit undefined behavior, then
the target property trivially holds, by the first disjunct of σ˜ . Otherwise, by the same reasoning as in
Example 3.1 above, there is no way of proving that the bad event doesn’t happen. More generally,
the mappings confirm that there is little hope of proving non-trivial properties involving new target
events, using source-level reasoning. Indeed, what one can prove about target-only events can only
be that either they cannot appear, because there is no undefined behavior, or that any of them can
appear, in case of an undefined behavior. 
3.2 Resource Exhaustion
In this section, we return to the discussion about resource exhaustion from the introduction.
Resource exhaustion captures the fact that low-level target languages are often subject to hardware
or software restrictions that may halt the execution earlier: for instance, this could occur when no
more memory could be allocated, when encountering a stack overflow, or when running out of gas
in a smart contract. These restrictions are often not considered in the source language. For instance,
the verified CakeML compiler [50] uses an abstract ML-like source language, that is compiled all
the way down to assembly. In the lower levels, memory usage is restricted. This is captured by
their compiler correctness theorem in the following manner:
Any binary produced by a successful evaluation of the compiler function will either:
• behave exactly according to the observable behavior of the source semantics, or
• behave the same as the source up to some point at which it terminates with an
out-of-memory error.
Example 3.3 (Resource Exhaustion). We consider traces made of events drawn from ΣS in the
source, and ΣT = ΣS ∪ {Resource_Limit_Hit}. We recall the trace relation for resource exhaustion:
s ∼ t ⇐⇒ s = t ∨ ∃m ≤ s. t =m · Resource_Limit_Hit
Formally, this relation is similar to the one for undefined behavior, except this time it is the target
trace that is allowed to end early, instead of the source trace.
By manipulating the definitions, we can see that the induced trace property mappings σ˜ and τ˜
are equal to the following ( , file ResourceExhaustion.v):
σ˜ (πT ) = {s | s ∈ πT } ∩ {s | ∀m ≤ s.m · Resource_Limit_Hit ∈ πT }
τ˜ (πS) = πS ∪ {m · Resource_Limit_Hit | ∃s ∈ πS.m ≤ s}
These capture the following intuitions:
• The target-to-source mapping σ˜ states that to prove a property of the compiled program, one
has to prove that the source program’s traces satisfy two conditions: (1) they must also satisfy
the target property, and (2) each of their prefixes immediately followed by a resource exhaustion
error must satisfy the target property.
• The other mapping τ˜ states that a compiled program can guarantee the same properties as the
source program, except that all traces must be allowed to end early due to resource exhaustion.
Note that σ˜ is restrictive: any property that prevents resource exhaustion cannot be proved using
source-level reasoning. Indeed, if πT does not allow resource exhaustion, then σ˜ (πT ) = ∅. This
was to be expected because resource exhaustion is simply not accounted for at the source level.
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In this model, we also proved that safety properties are mapped (in the two directions) to other
safety properties ( , file ResourceExhaustion.v). In particular, this means that to obtain some
target safety properties one only has to do source reasoning about safety properties.
CakeML’s compiler correctness theorem is an example of CC∼ for the ∼ relation above. We also
implemented two small compilers that are correct for this relation, as other examples of cases where
this relation is needed. For space reasons, the full details can be found in the Coq development in
the supplementary materials ( , file ResourceExhaustionExample.v for the first example, and
folder ResourceExhaustion/ for the second example).
The first compiler goes from a simple expression language, similar to the one of §3.3, but without
inputs, to the same language, but where the execution is fuel bounded: each execution step consumes
some fuel, and the execution immediately halts when it is exhausted. The compiler is identity.
More interestingly, we also proved this CC∼ instance for a variant of Xavier Leroy’s DSSS’17
compiler from a while language to a simple stack-machine [27], assuming the determinism of the
stack machine. We enriched the two languages with outputs, and we modified the semantics of the
stack-machine so that it gets into an error state if the stack reaches a certain size.
We extended the compiler to handle outputs and proved it attains our CC∼ instance. The proof
uses a canonical forward simulation modified to allow failing: If the source execution takes a step
from a configuration to another configuration emitting some event (that can be a silent event),
then there are two possibilities for a related target configuration: either (i) it can take some steps to
another configuration related to the second source configuration and emit the same event (as in a
standard simulation), or (ii) it can take some steps to an error state, not emitting any event. This
then corresponds to the case of a resource exhaustion error: the target execution can terminate
early, only producing a prefix of the source execution trace, as allowed by the relation. 
3.3 Different Source and Target Values
In this section, we illustrate trace-relating compilation by considering a compiler that compiles
source-level booleans into target-level natural numbers. The source language is a simple statically-
typed expression language, described below. Expressions e are either naturals n, booleans b, condi-
tionals, arithmetic expressions, relational expressions, boolean inputs inb or natural inputs inn. A
trace s is a list of inputs is paired with a result r.
e ::= n | b | e op e | if e then e else e | inb | inn op ::= + | × | ≤ ty ::= B | N
r ::= n | b | error i ::= n | b is ::= i · is | ∅ s ::= ⟨is, r⟩
Types ty are either N (naturals) or B (booleans), and typing is defined as follows:
(Type-nat)
⊢ n : N
(Type-bool)
⊢ b : B
(Type-plus)
⊢ e1 : N ⊢ e2 : N
⊢ e1 + e2 : N
(Type-times)
⊢ e1 : N ⊢ e2 : N
⊢ e1 × e2 : N
(Type-ite)
⊢ e1 : B ⊢ e2 : ty ⊢ e3 : ty
⊢ if e1 then e2 else e3 : ty
(Type-le)
⊢ e1 : N ⊢ e2 : N
⊢ e1 ≤ e2 : B
(Type-in-b)
⊢ inb : B
(Type-in-n)
⊢ inn : N
The source language has a big-step operational semantics defined as follows (error rules omitted):
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(Sem-nat)
n ⇝ ⟨∅, n⟩
(Sem-in-nat)
inn ⇝ ⟨n ·∅, n⟩
(Sem-bool)
b ⇝ ⟨∅, b⟩
(Sem-in-bool)
inb ⇝ ⟨b ·∅, b⟩
(Sem-op-nat)
e1 ⇝ ⟨is1, n1⟩ e2 ⇝ ⟨is2, n2⟩ op ∈ {+,×}
e1 op e2 ⇝ ⟨is1 · is2, (n1 op n2)⟩
(Sem-le)
e1 ⇝ ⟨is1, n1⟩ e2 ⇝ ⟨is2, n2⟩
e1 ≤ e2 ⇝ ⟨is1 · is2, (n1 ≤ n2)⟩
(Sem-ite-true)
e1 ⇝ ⟨is1, true⟩ e2 ⇝ ⟨is2, r2⟩
if e1 then e2 else e3 ⇝ ⟨is1 · is2, r2⟩
(Sem-ite-false)
e1 ⇝ ⟨is1, false⟩ e3 ⇝ ⟨is3, r3⟩
if e1 then e2 else e3 ⇝ ⟨is1 · is3, r3⟩
Well-typed programs do not produce error ( Theorem type_soundness, file TypeRelationExampleInput.v).
The target is untyped and only has naturals. The source-level ≤ operator is replaced by a four-
argument if statement whose condition is that the first argument is less than the second.
e ::= n | e op e | if e ≤ e then e else e | inn op ::= + | ×
r ::= n i ::= n is ::= i · is | ∅ t ::= ⟨is, r⟩
The semantics of the target language is given in big-step style. Since we only have naturals and all
expressions operate on them, no error result is possible. Rules Sem-nat, Sem-in-nat and Sem-op-nat
are the same as for the source language and we present the new rules only:
(Sem-itele-true)
e1 ⇝ ⟨is1,n1⟩ e2 ⇝ ⟨is2,n2⟩
n1 ≤ n2 e3 ⇝ ⟨is3,n3⟩
if e1 ≤ e2 then e3 else e4 ⇝ ⟨is1 · is2 · is3,n3⟩
(Sem-ite-false)
e1 ⇝ ⟨is1,n1⟩ e2 ⇝ ⟨is2,n2⟩
n1 > n2 e4 ⇝ ⟨is4,n4⟩
if e1 ≤ e2 then e3 else e4 ⇝ ⟨is1 · is2 · is4n4⟩
The compiler takes source expressions and emits target expressions as follows:
n↓ = n true↓ = 1 e1 + e2↓ = e1↓+e2↓
inn↓ = inn false↓ = 0 e1 ≤ e2↓ = if e1↓ ≤ e2↓ then 1 else 0
inb↓ = inn e1 × e2↓ = e1↓×e2↓ if e1 then e2 else e3↓ = if e1↓ ≤ 0 then e3↓ else e2↓
The interesting case is compiling the if-then-else statement, where the boolean condition is trans-
formed into a comparison against 0 (and the branches are swapped accordingly).
Defining the Trace Relation. We first relate basic values (naturals and booleans) as follows:
n ∼ n true ∼ n if n > 0 false ∼ 0
We then extend the relation to lists of inputs in a pointwise fashion (Rules Empty and Cons) and
lift that relation to traces (Rules Nat and Bool).
(Empty)
∅ ∼ ∅
(Cons)
i ∼ i is ∼ is
i · is ∼ i · is
(Nat)
is ∼ is n ∼ n
⟨is, n⟩ ∼ ⟨is,n⟩
(Bool)
is ∼ is b ∼ n
⟨is, b⟩ ∼ ⟨is,n⟩
Compiler correctness. The compiler is proven correct in the sense of CC∼.
Theorem 3.4 ( ·↓ is correct). ·↓ is CC∼.
Proof. ( ) See Theorem correctness in TypeRelationExampleInput.v. □
A difficulty in the trace-relating compilation setting is that the proof of Theorem 3.4 does not
follow from determinacy, input totality, and forward simulation, as is the case for compilation
chains that have the same set of traces at both source and target level [26]. Instead, because the
trace relation is not injective (e.g., both 0 and false are mapped to 0 in the target), the type system
is used to disambiguate between the two possibilities to backtranslate a target trace. The property
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mappings σ˜ and τ˜ induced by the trace relation ∼ defined above capture the intuition behind
encoding booleans as naturals:
• the source-to-target mapping allows for true to be encoded by any non-zero natural number;
• the target-to-source mapping requires, for example, that 0 is replaceable by both 0 and false.
A possible extension to the property mappings is to take into account the type of the source
program and obtain a type-aware property mapping. That is, in order to study the source obligation
for source programs e of type ty, one can instead consider the following restriction: σ˜ty(πT ) =
σ˜ (πT ) ∩ {s | ∃e′ : ty. e′⇝s}. This strengthens the proof obligation by restricting it to traces that
can be produced by programs of a fixed type. Reasoning using this proof obligation is indeed correct,
because when σ is used in TPσ , it is always restricted to source traces produced by a program of
the appropriate type. This narrowing of the source obligation can be used to guide verification:
indeed, if σ˜ states that one has to prove that the result is either 0 or false, then σ˜ty tells us which
disjunct to prove: if the source programs we are interested in have type N then 0, else false.
3.4 IO Abstraction Mismatches
We now consider how to relate traces where a single source action is compiled to multiple target
ones. To illustrate this, we use a source language that can output compound values of arbitrary size,
and a target language where sent values have a fixed size. Concretely, the source has actions such
as send ⟨v1, ⟨v2, v3⟩⟩, which is compiled into a sequence of sends send v1 ; send v2 ; send v3.
The Source Language Np. Np is a statically-typed language with expressions, commands and
simple types (natural numbers and pairs) whose syntax is presented below. The key aspect of Np is
the primitive for sending pairs over a network interface. The type system of Np is unsurprising.
c ::= skip | ifz e then c else c | c; c | send e v ::= n | ⟨v, v⟩ τ ::= N | τ × τ
e ::= n | e ⊕ e | ⟨e, e⟩ | e.1 | e.2 E ::= [·] | E ⊕ e | n ⊕ E | E.1 | E.2 | ⟨E, e⟩ | ⟨v,E⟩
(Type-Np-skip)
⊢ skip
(Type-Np-seq)
⊢ c ⊢ c′
⊢ c; c′
(Type-Np-send)
⊢ e : τ × τ ′
⊢ send e
(Type-Np-if)
⊢ e : N ⊢ c ⊢ c
⊢ ifz e then c else c′
(Type-Np-n)
⊢ n : N
(Type-Np-op)
⊢ e : N ⊢ e′ : N
Γ ⊢ e ⊕ e′ : N
(Type-Np-pair)
⊢ e : τ ⊢ e′ : τ ′
Γ ⊢ ⟨e, e′⟩ : τ × τ ′
(Type-Np-p1)
⊢ e : τ × τ ′
⊢ e.1 : τ
(Type-Np-p2)
⊢ e : τ × τ ′
⊢ e.2 : τ ′
Np has a contextual, small-step, call by value semantics for expressions (e ↪→ e′) and a big-step
semantics for commands (c s−→ c′) that produces traces s, i.e. sequences of messages M (i.e. pairs
⟨v, v⟩) sent over the network. In the following, queuing the empty element is ineffective: s = ϵ · s .
(Eval-Np-Op)
n′′ = n ⊕ n′
n ⊕ n′ ↪→ n′′
(Eval-Np-P1)
⟨v, v′⟩ .1 ↪→ v
(Eval-Np-P2)
⟨v, v′⟩ .2 ↪→ v′
(Eval-Np-Ctx)
e ↪→ e′
E [e] ↪→ E [e′]
(E-Np-skip)
skip
ϵ−−→ skip
(E-Np-seq)
c
s−→ skip c′ s
′
−−→ skip
c; c′ s·s
′
−−−→ skip
(Eval-Np-If-t)
e ↪→∗ 0 c s−→ skip
if e then c else c′
s−→ skip
(Eval-Np-If-f)
e ↪→∗ n , 0 c′ s−→ skip
if e then c else c′
s−→ skip
(Eval-Np-Send)
e ↪→∗ ⟨v, v′⟩
send e
⟨v,v′⟩−−−−−−→ skip
(Sem-Np)
c
s−→ skip
c ⇝ s
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The Target Language Nn. Nn is a statically-typed language with the same types as Np, but its
primitive for sending over a network interface only sends natural numbers. Nothing changes
regarding statements, terms, values, types and evaluation contexts between Nn and Np. There is
only one typing rule that changes compared to Np, the one for send n. Nn has the same dynamic
semantics as Np, the only changes regard the nature of messages and the reduction of send n.
M ::= n
(Type-Nn-send)
⊢ e : N
⊢ send e
(Eval-Nn-Send)
send n
n−−→ skip
The Compiler from Np to Nn: (·)↓. The compiler from Np to Nn is defined inductively on the type
derivation of a source statement ( ·↓ : ⊢ c → c) which, in turn, relies on compilation of expressions
( ·↓ : ⊢ e : τ → e). The only interesting case is when compiling a send e, where we use the source
type information concerning the message (i.e. a pair) being sent to deconstruct that pair into a
sequence of natural numbers, which is what is sent in the target.
The compiler operates on type derivations for terms. Thus, compiling c; c′ would look like the
following (using D as a metavariable to range over derivations).(
D
⊢ c
D′
⊢ c′
⊢ c; v′
)y = ( D⊢ c )y ; ( D′⊢ c′ )y
However, note that each judgment uniquely identifies which typing rule is being applied and the
underlying derivation. Thus, for compactness, we only write the judgment in the compilation and
implicitly apply the related typing rule to obtain the underlying judgments for recursive calls.
(⊢ n : N)↓ = n (⊢ e.1 : τ )↓ = (⊢ e : τ × τ ′)↓.1
(⊢ e ⊕ e′ : N)↓ = (⊢ e : N)↓ ⊕ (e′ : N)↓ (⊢ e.2 : τ ′)↓ = (⊢ e : τ × τ ′)↓.2
(⊢ ⟨e, e′⟩ : τ × τ ′)↓ = ⟨ (⊢ e : τ )↓, (⊢ e′ : τ ′)↓⟩(
⊢
ifz e
then c else c′
)y = ifz (⊢ e : N)↓then (⊢ c)↓ else (⊢ c′)↓ (⊢ skip)↓ = skip
(⊢ send e)↓ = gensend ( (⊢ e : τ × τ ′)↓) (⊢ c; c′)↓ = (⊢ c)↓; (⊢ c′)↓
The gensend (·) function takes a source expression and returns a sequence of target send instruc-
tions that send each element of the expression. Formally: gensend (·) : ⊢ e : τ → c
gensend (⊢ e : τ ) =
{
send (⊢ e.1 : N)↓; send (⊢ e.2 : N)↓ if τ = N × N
gensend (⊢ e.1 : τ ′); gensend (⊢ e.2 : τ ′′) if τ = τ ′ × τ ′′
Relating Traces. We start with the trivial relation between numbers: n∼0 n, i.e. numbers are
related when they are the same number. We cannot build a relation between single messages since
a single source message is related to multiple target ones. However we can build a relation between
a source message and a target trace: M∼ t, defined inductively on the structure of M.
(Trace-Rel-N-N)
n∼0 n n′ ∼0 n′
⟨n, n′⟩ ∼n · n′
(Trace-Rel-N-M)
n∼0 n M∼ t
⟨n,M⟩ ∼n · t
(Trace-Rel-M-N)
M∼ t n∼0 n
⟨M, n⟩ ∼ t · n
(Trace-Rel-M-M)
M∼ t M′ ∼ t′
⟨M,M′⟩ ∼ t · t′
A pair of naturals is related to the two messages that send each element of the pair (Rule Trace-
Rel-N-N). Otherwise, if we split a pair into sub-pairs, we request all such sub-pairs to be related
(Rules Trace-Rel-N-M to Trace-Rel-M-M).
With this we can define the trace relation between source and target traces: s ∼ t.
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(Trace-Rel-Single)
s∼ t M∼ t′
s · M∼ t · t′
(Trace-Rel-Empty)
∅∼∅
Trivially, traces are related when they are both empty (Rule Trace-Rel-Empty). Alternatively, given
related trace, we can concatenate a source message and a second target trace provided that they
are related (Rule Trace-Rel-Single). This relation induces the standard mappings between source
and target properties, τ˜ and σ˜ (Definition 2.5).
To prove that the compiler is correct (Theorem 3.7) we need two auxiliary results. Lemma 3.5
tells us that the way we break down a source send into multiple target ones is correct. Lemma 3.6
tells us that the compilation of expressions is correct. For brevity, proofs are omitted and can be
found in the appendix.
Lemma 3.5 (gensend (·) works). if gensend ( (⊢ e : τ × τ ′)↓) t−→ skip then e ↪→∗ v and v∼ t
Lemma 3.6 ( (·)↓ is correct for expressions). if (⊢ e : τ )↓ ↪→∗ (⊢ v : τ )↓ then e ↪→∗ v
Theorem 3.7 ( (·)↓ is correct). (·)↓ is CC∼.
With our trace relation, the trace property mappings capture the following intuitions:
• The target-to-source mapping states that a source property can reconstruct target messages
as it sees fit. For example, trace 4 · 6 · 5 · 7 is related to ⟨4, 6⟩ · ⟨5, 7⟩ and ⟨⟨4, ⟨6, ⟨5, 7⟩⟩⟩⟩ (and
many more variations). This gives freedom to the source implementation of a specific target
behavior, which is a result of the non-injectivity of ∼.4
• The source-to-target mapping states that the only valid target traces are those that source
programs can compute, without any addition. This intuitively seems to preserve the meaning
of the property, mapping source safety properties to target safety properties and even source
hyperproperties to target hyperproperties.
3.5 Low-Level Observations and Abstract Noninterference
To conclude this example tour of trace-relating compilation, we explore a scenario in which target
observations are more precise than the source ones by including the consumption of some physical
resource—here, time—and consider the impact on a subset-closed hyperproperty, noninterference.
Recall from §2.5 that, when using CC∼ to reason about the preservation of subset-closed hyper-
properties, the loss of precision introduced by the subset closure of the lifted hyperproperty after
mapping can be problematic. In particular, below we show that for the considered compilation
chain, noninterference is not preserved. However, all is not lost: a weaker form of noninterference is
preserved, and can be precisely described using the parameterized framework of abstract noninter-
ference [12]. Furthermore, given this general framework, we can even systematically determine the
precise notion of noninterference that a compiled program satisfies, given any notion of interference
that the source program satisfies.
To illustrate the problem of preserving noninterference through compilation, let TraceS denote
the set of traces in the source, and TraceT = TraceS×Nω , where Nω ≜ N ∪ {ω} be the set of target
traces. The associated natural number in a target trace denotes the time spent in producing the
trace (ω if infinite). We define the trace relation as follows:
s ∼ t ⇐⇒ ∃n ∈ Nω . t = (s,n)
A trace produced by some target program is related to the source trace when it simply forgets the
time spent in the computation. Therefore, a compiler is CC∼ if whenever a trace is exhibited at the
target level, the same can be simulated, no matter in how much time, in the source.
4 Forcing injectivity of ∼ would simply be a matter of adding messages for open and close parentheses in target traces.
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CC∼ and Noninterference Preservation. Let us first recall the formal definition of noninterference.
For a given low equivalence relation over traces low and its restriction over input events lowI
(and their corresponding equivalence classes [·]low and [·]lowI ), noninterference demands that
publicly-indistinguishable inputs (i.e. lowI -equivalent) produce publicly-indistinguishable outputs
(i.e. low-equivalent). Formally:
Definition 3.8 (Noninterference by equivalence classes [44]).
NI =
{
π
 ∀t1t2 ∈ π . [t1]lowI = [t2]lowI ⇒ [t1]low = [t2]low }
In the context of our trace-relating compiler, the source notion of noninterference, NIS, differs
from the target notion of noninterference, NIT, because more precise observations are possi-
ble in the target: i.e. comparing time. To understand formally why noninterference is not pre-
served, consider a source program W that satisfies source noninterference NIS. Then W↓ satis-
fies NIT only if executions of W↓ that produce the same trace of events do not take different
time: NIT = {πS × {n} | πS ∈ NIS ∧ n ∈ Nω }. Because noninterference is a subset-closed hyper-
property (§2.5), attaining CC∼ only ensures that W↓ satisfies Cl⊆ ◦ τ˜ (NIS), which is equal to
{πS × I | πS ∈ NIS ∧ I ⊆ Nω }, and hence strictly weaker than NIT.
Intuitively, the only guarantee we get out of CC∼ here is that every target adversary that is not
able to measure the time W↓ takes for its computations, cannot notice any interference. Therefore,
some form of noninterference is preserved, if we are willing to declassify time.
Abstract noninterference. To formally capture the weaker notion of noninterference that is
preserved by CC∼ we appeal to the concept of abstract noninterference [12]. Roughly speaking, the
observational power of the attacker can be weakened by choosing more liberal relations than low ,
and some declassification can be allowed by checking low equivalence only on some of the inputs,
i.e. by choosing a more restrictive lowI . Abstract noninterference ANI
ρ
ϕ is a parameterized notion
of noninterference, where ρ is an explicit characterization of a harmless attacker, and ϕ denotes the
permitted declassification.
Formally, ϕ and ρ are required to be upper-closed operators (i.e. monotonic, idempotent and
extensive).5 The set of upper-closed operators on a poset (X , ≤) is denoted by uco(X ), though here
we are only interested in posets of the form (2X , ⊆) for some set X . Hereafter, for x ∈ X , we simply
write f (x) for f ({x}).
Definition 3.9 (Abstract Noninterference [12]). Let ϕ, ρ ∈ uco(2Trace)
ANI ρϕ = {π | ∀t1t2 ∈ π . ϕ(t1) = ϕ(t2) ⇒ ρ(t1) = ρ(t2)}
As expected, for ϕ = [_]lowI (i.e. no declassification) and ρ = [_]low (i.e. attacker can only see
public events), ANI ρϕ coincides with the NI of Definition 3.8.
Trace-Relating Compilation and ANI. We can now formally express that if a source program W
satisfies NIS, then W↓ satisfies an instance of abstract noninterference, specifically ANI ρϕ where:
ϕ(πT ) =
⋃
t∈πT
[t]lowI ρ(πT ) =
{(s,n)  n ∈ Nω ∧ (∃n′ ∈ Nω . (s,n′) ∈ πT )}
5An example of upper-closed operator is the function that maps every property to the smallest safety property including
it, π¯ = ∩ {S | S ∈ Safety ∧ S ⊇ π }. This is the topological closure in the topology described by Clarkson and Schneider
[9]. Another example is the function that maps every property to the union of the low-equivalent classes of its traces:
ρ(π ) = [π ]low =
⋃
t∈π [t ]low .
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It is straightforward to show ANI ρ
ϕ
= Cl⊆ ◦ τ˜ (NIS). Therefore, in this setting, we know that a
CC∼ compiler preserves ANI ρ
ϕ
. This is helpful because ρ defines what target information must be
hidden or protected, and ϕ defines for which inputs the policy must hold. In this specific setting, as
intuitively expected, execution time must be hidden, and the policy still must hold on the same
inputs considered in the source.
Compiling ANI. Beyond using ANI for a specific compilation example, we can formulate in a
general way how a CC∼ compiler preserves an arbitrary notion of interference in the source, as long
as it is expressed as an instance of ANI. Theorem 3.10 shows that it is always possible to preserve
some notion of noninterference, whenever source traces are an abstraction of target ones (i.e. when
∼ is a total and surjective map).
Theorem 3.10 (Compiling ANI). Assume traces of source and target languages are related via
∼⊆ TraceS × TraceT and that ∼ is a total, surjective map from target to source traces. Assume ↓ is a
CC∼ compiler, and ϕ, ρ ∈ uco(2TraceS ).
If W satisfies ANI ρϕ , then W↓ satisfies ANI
ρ#
ϕ#
where ϕ# and ρ# are defined as follows:
ϕ# = д ◦ ϕ ◦ f ρ# = д ◦ ρ ◦ f
f (πT ) = {s | ∃t ∈ πT . s ∼ t} д(πS) = {t | ∀s. s ∼ t ⇒ s ∈ πS}
Proof. ( ) See Theorem compiling_ANI in ANI.v. □
A consequence of Theorem 3.10 is that whenever we allow for new observations on noninterfering
programs, aweaker notion of noninterference is still guaranteed to be satisfied. The identity compiler
is indeed CC∼ for the relation ∼ that “forgets” about the extra target observations.
4 PRESERVING OTHER (HYPER)PROPERTY CLASSES
In this section we investigate how to preserve two classes of (hyper)properties beyond trace
properties: safety properties (§4.1) and arbitrary hyperproperties that are not just subset-closed
(§4.2). For each of these classes, we start by giving an intuition of what it means to preserve such a
class in the equal-trace setting, then we study preservation of that class in the trace-relating setting.
4.1 Preserving Safety Properties
Safety collects all trace properties prescribing that “something bad never happens” , so that their
violation can be monitored and, when observed, no longer restored [9]. To define this class we will
assume traces are similar to the CompCert ones, i.e. lists or streams of events, so that we can easily
talk about finite prefixesm of a trace t , writtenm ≤ t .
Definition 4.1 (Safety Properties). A property π is Safety if ∀t < π . ∃m ≤ t . ∀t ′.m ≤ t ′ ⇒ t ′ < π .
A proof of the preservation of all trace properties, i.e. of CC=, may require to show that a source
program can produce an infinite stream of events. For safety properties one is required to only to
show the following weaker variant of CC=,
SC= ≡ ∀W,m. W↓⇝m ⇒ W ⇝m
whereW ⇝ m means producingm, i.e. a finite prefix of a trace produced byW (formally: ∃t .m ≤
t ∧W ⇝ t ).
Recalling the intention of safety properties to prescribe “something bad never happens” ,W ⇝∗ m
can be interpreted as a violation of a safety property, the one stating “the finite list of eventsm is never
observed" . The statement of SC= can therefore be read as “whenever W↓ violates a safety property,
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then W does”. By contraposition it has been shown that this is equivalent to the preservation of
arbitrary safety properties [2]:
SC= ⇐⇒ ∀π ∈ Safety.W |= π ⇒ W↓ |= π
In the trace-relating setting, we generalize SC= by requiring that whenever W↓ violates a target
safety property πT ∈ SafetyT, then W violates its source interpretation, σ˜ (πT ).
Definition 4.2 (SC∼). Given a trace relation ∼⊆ TraceS × TraceT, a compilation chain ↓ is SC∼ if
and only if the following holds:
SC∼ ≡ ∀W ∀m.W↓⇝m ⇒ ∃t. ∃s. m ≤ t ∧ s ∼ t ∧ W⇝s
Again we propose two generalizations of the preservation of safety properties that are equivalent
to SC∼. The only detail to take care of is that τ˜ (πS) for πS ∈ SafetyS is not necessarily in SafetyT, so
that similarly to what we did in §2.5, we have to close τ˜ (πS) in the class of target safety properties.6
Theorem 4.3 (Trinitarian view for Safety). Given a trace relation ∼⊆ TraceS × TraceT, and its
induced property mappings σ˜andτ˜ , SC∼ is equivalent to the following two criteria:
SPσ˜ ≡ ∀W ∀πT ∈ SafetyT. W |= σ˜ (πT ) ⇒ W↓ |= πT
TPSafe◦τ˜ ≡ ∀W ∀πS ∈ 2TraceS . W |= (πS) ⇒ W↓ |= (Safe ◦ τ˜ )(πS)
SC∼
SPσ˜ TPSafe◦τ˜
where Safe(πT ) = ⋂ {ST | ST ∈ SafetyT ∧ πT ⊆ ST } is the smallest target safety property that
contains πT .
Notice that in TPSafe◦τ˜ we quantify over arbitrary source properties, but the guarantee we get
in the target is given by approximating the guarantee defined by τ˜ , with a safety property. This
second approximation is optimal by minimality of Safe, and is necessary as τ˜ may not map safety
properties to safety properties (in this case, no comparison with SC∼ would be possible). .
Proof. ( ) See tilde_SC_σSP and tilde_SC_Cl_τTP in NonRobustSafetyCriterion.v. □
4.2 Preserving Non-Subset Closed Hyperproperties
Hyperproperties can be used to provide an exact specification for a program W. For a trace property
π , by W |= {π } we mean that the traces W can emit are all and only those that satisfy π . This is a
much stronger requirement than W |= π , since the latter prescribes that only traces in π can be
observed when running W, but not necessarily all of them. It is therefore interesting to study the
satisfaction and the preservation of arbitrary, in particular non-subset-closed, hyperproperties.
CC= is not enough to guarantee the preservation of the hyperproperty just mentioned ({π })
as it only ensures refinement of the behaviors through compilation but not the other inclusion,
sometimes referred to as reflection. It is well known that the following strengthening of CC= is
equivalent to the preservation of arbitrary hyperproperties.
Theorem 4.4 (HC=, HP). For every compilation chain ↓, the followings are equivalent
HC= ≡ ∀W. beh(W↓) = beh(W) HP ≡ ∀W∀H ∈ 22Trace . W |= H ⇒ W↓ |= H
The generalization to the trace-relating setting, HC∼ ≡ ∀W. beh(W↓) = τ˜ (beh(W)), does not
come with two equivalent formulations in terms of preservation of hyperproperties. While for HPτ˜
the equivalence holds unconditionally, for HPσ˜ we do not provide a full characterization but only
an implication under some extra assumptions. It is still possible, and correct, to deduce a source
6Topological closure, the considered topology is defined by the closed sets being exactly the safety properties [9].
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obligation for a given target hyperproperty HT but we require that in the composition τ˜ ◦ σ˜ no
information is lost (i.e. we do not just have a Galois connection, but a Galois insertion).
Theorem 4.5 (Weak Trinity). Given a trace relation ∼⊆ TraceS × TraceT, and its induced property
mappings σ˜andτ˜ , HC∼ is equivalent to HPτ˜ below. Moreover if τ˜ ⇆ σ˜ is a Galois insertion (i.e.
τ˜ ◦ σ˜ = id), HC∼ implies HPσ˜ below.
HPτ˜ ≡ ∀W∀HS ∈ 22TraceS . W |= HS ⇒ W↓ |= τ˜ (HS)
HPσ˜ ≡ ∀W∀HT ∈ 22TraceT . W |= σ˜ (HT) ⇒ W↓ |= HT
HC∼
HPτ˜HPσ˜
Ins
ert
ion
Insertion
Proof. ( ) Theorems rel_HC_τHP and rel_HC_σHP in NonRobustHyperCriterion.v. □
We sum up the proposed generalizations, and order them according their strength in Figure 2.
CC∼
TPτ˜TPσ˜
SCHPCl⊆◦τ˜SCHPCl⊆◦σ˜
HC∼
HPτ˜HPσ˜
Ins
ert
ion
Insertion
SC∼
SPσ˜ TPSafe◦τ˜
Fig. 2. Generalization of Compiler Correctness and its variations to the trace-relating setting.
5 TRACE-RELATING SECURE COMPILATION
So far we studied compiler correctness criteria parameterized by a relation between source and
target traces. However, in practice, programs are not used on their own, but they live in a context
where they can interact with other programs, libraries, etc. This context is out-of-control of the
user; in most cases, it can not be assumed that everything the compiled program will interact with
is benign and thus it can behave maliciously and try to disrupt the compiled program.
Hence, in this section we consider the following secure compilation scenario: a source program is
compiled, and linked with an arbitrary target-level context, i.e. one that may not be the compilation
of a source context. Compiler correctness does not address this case, as it never considers arbitrary
target contexts. In fact compiler correctness considers either no target context (whole programs) or
so-called well-behaved target contexts (compositional compiler correctness), i.e. target contexts
that behave like source ones.
To account for this scenario, Abate et al. [2] describe a class of secure compilation criteria based
on the preservation of classes of properties against arbitrary target context. For each of these criteria,
they give an equivalent “property-free” criterion, in the same manner as the duality between TP
and CC. For instance, their robust trace properties preservation criterion (RTP) states that for any
property π , if program P plugged into any context C satisfies the property, then the compiled
program P↓ plugged into any target context C satisfies the (same) property. Their equivalent
criterion to RTP is RTC, which states that for any trace produced by the compiled program when
linked with any target context, there is a source context that produces the same trace. Formally
(writing C [P] to mean program P linked with context C) they define:
RTP ≡ ∀π ,P, (∀C,∀s,C [P]⇝s =⇒ s ∈ π ) =⇒ (∀C,∀t,C [P↓]⇝t =⇒ t ∈ π ).
RTC ≡ ∀P,∀C,∀t ,C [P↓]⇝t =⇒ ∃C,C [P]⇝t
Abate et al. [2] propose many more equivalent pairs of criteria, each one preserving different
classes of (hyper)properties we discussed earlier: properties, safety properties, hypersafety proper-
ties, subset-closed hyperproperties, hyperproperties and more. However, all these criteria are stated
in a setting where source and target traces are the same. In this section, we scale their result to the
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trace-relating setting, obtaining the same trinitarian view of secure compilation as for compiler
correctness (§5.1). Then, we provide examples that our trinitarian view of secure compilation
criteria can be instantiated for properties (§5.2), safety properties (§5.3) and hypersafety properties
(§5.4). Interestingly, the last two such examples are adaptations of existing results from the secure
compilation literature.
5.1 Trace-Relating Secure Compilation: A Spectrum of Trinities
The generalization of the hierarchy proposed in [2] builds on top of the ideas from Section 2. Most of
the definitions and theorems presented depend only on source and target traces, (hyper)properties
or specific classes of these. In particular it is always possible to define a Galois connection between
properties, once a trace relation is given (Definition 2.5), so that the generalization of RTC to the
trace-relating setting (Definition 5.1) can be shown equivalent to the two expected criteria about
preservation of robust satisfaction (Theorem 5.2).
Definition 5.1 (RTC∼). A compilation chain ↓ is RTC∼ if and only if the following holds
RTC∼ ≡ ∀P ∀CT ∀t.CT [P↓]⇝t ⇒ ∃CS ∃s. CS [P]⇝s ∧ s ∼ t
Theorem 5.2 (Trinity for Robust Trace Properties). For any trace relation ∼ and induced property
mappings τ˜ and σ˜ , we have: RTPτ˜ ⇐⇒ RTC∼ ⇐⇒ RTPσ˜ for the following definition, where
|=R means property satisfaction in the robust setting:
RTPτ˜ ≡ ∀P∀πS ∈ 2TraceS .P |=R πS ⇒ P↓ |=R τ˜ (πS)
RTPσ˜ ≡ ∀P∀πT ∈ πT .P |=R σ˜ (πT ) ⇒ P↓ |=R πT
RTC∼
RTPσ˜ RTPτ˜
Proof. ( ) Theorems rel_RTC_τRTP and rel_RTC_σRTP in RobustTraceCriterion.v. □
Due to spaces constraints, we do not list all the definitions for the criteria for all possible
subclasses. Instead, we provide an illustrative diagram of the criteria from [2] that are brought
to the trace-relating setting (Figure 3) and describe a way to navigate it. The diagram indicates
with a the trinities whose equivalences have been proven in Coq. The interested reader will find
omitted definitions in the anonymous supplementary materials.
RTC∼
RT P τ˜RT P σ˜
RSC
RTCSafe◦τ˜RSC σ˜
RSCHC∼
RSCHPCl⊆◦τ˜RSCHPCl⊆◦σ˜
RHC∼
RHP τ˜RHP σ˜
Insert
ion
Insertion
RHSC∼
RSCHPHSafe◦τ˜RHSP σ˜
R2rTC∼
R2rT P τ˜R2rT P σ˜
R2rSCHC∼
R2rSCHPCl⊆◦τ˜R2rSCHPCl⊆◦σ˜
R2rSC∼
R2rT P 2rSafe◦τ˜R2rSP σ˜
Fig. 3. Hierarchy of trinitarian views of secure compilation criteria preserving classes of hyperproperties.
For a given trace relation ∼, the diagram orders the generalized criteria according to their relative
strength (higher is stronger); if a trinity implies another, then the former is stronger. Moreover,
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it shows that for all of them a trinitarian view is possible. Every point in the diagram has one of
the two following shapes: R _ P (·) or R _ C∼. In either case the common hole (_) is filled with an
acronym of some class of (hyper)properties or relational (hyper)properties. We adopt the acronyms
of Abate et al. [2], so H means “hyperproperties”, SCH means “subset-closed hyperproperties”, HS
means “hypersafety properties”, TP means “trace properties” and S means “safety properties”. The
second hole of R _ P (·) is filled with an operator that can be one of τ˜ and σ˜ . In certain cases, as
explained in §4.1 for the case of compiler correctness, this operator is closed in a way that ensures
the final image will be in the considered class of (relational)(hyper)properties. As seen before,
closing with Safe (i.e. Safe ◦ τ˜ (πS)) is a safety property for arbitrary πS.
As previously mentioned, this closing is needed because certain property-free criteria do not
follow from their their property-full one but from a stronger one that is closed under a certain
class of properties. This is the case for RSC τ˜ , which instead is derived from closing RTC with safety
properties, i.e. RTCSafe◦τ˜ (as was happening in Theorem 4.3). To facilitate reading the diagram,
we color-code the trinity from which the stronger criterion is borrowed in order to realize that a
criterion is not derived from the current trinity but from a different one (with the same background
color). Specifically, the trace-based trinity is blue, the subset-closed hyperproperty one is red, and
2-relational trace properties are green.
We now turn to examples that instantiate these criteria.
5.2 Trace-Relating Robust Preservation of Trace Properties
This section explores trace-relating secure compilation by extending the setting of §3.3 to a target
language having strictly more events than the source.
Source and Target Languages. The source and target languages used in this section (RS and RT,
respectively) are nearly identical expression languages borrowing from the syntax of the source
language of §3.3. Both languages add sequencing of expressions (which discards the result of
evaluating the first sub-expression), two kinds of output events, and the expressions that generate
them: outL n and outL n (usable respectively in RS and RT) and outH n (usable only in RT). The
presence of outH events is the sole difference between source and target.7 The extra events in
the target model the fact that the target language has more leeway to observe values during the
execution of the program than the source language has; in a sense, the target level could leak
information that may otherwise be protected from observation at the source.
Both languages and compilation chains now deal with partial programs, contexts and linking of
those to produce whole programs. In this setting, a whole program is the combination of a main
expression to be evaluated and a set of function definitions (with distinct names) that can refer to
their argument symbolically and can be called by the main expression and by other functions. The
set of functions of a whole program comes from a partial program and a context; the latter also
contains the main expression. The extensions of the typing rules and the operational semantics
for whole programs are unsurprising and therefore elided. The trace model also follows closely
that of §3.3: it consists of a list of regular events (including the new outputs) terminated by a result
event. Finally, a partial program and a context can be combined into a whole program when their
functions satisfy the requirements mentioned above.
The target language RT is a small extension of the source, which allows target-only events to
appear in expressions and consequently in traces.
e ::= · · · | e1; e2 | f(e) | outL n | arg fs ::= ⟨f1, e1⟩ , . . . , ⟨fn, en⟩ e ::= · · · | outH n
7The choice of the subscripts H and L is meant to evoke different classes of outputs, such as private and public ones, but no
direct relation to noninterference is considered here.
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P ::= ⟨fs, e⟩ C ::= fs W ::= C[P] i ::= · · · | outL n i ::= · · · | outH n
Relating Traces. In the present model, source and target traces differ only in the fact that the
target draws (regular) events from a strictly larger set than the source, i.e. ΣT ⊃ ΣS. A natural
relation between source and target traces essentially maps to a given target trace t the source trace
that erases from t those events that exist only at the target level. Let t|ΣS indicate that elements in
trace t are filtered to be only those that appear in alphabet ΣS. We define the trace relation as:
s ∼ t ⇐⇒ s = t|ΣS
In the opposite direction, a source trace s is related to many target traces, as a finite number of
target-only events can be inserted at any point in s. The induced mappings for this relation are:
τ˜ (πS) =
{
t
 ∃s. s = t|ΣS ∧ s ∈ πS} σ˜ (πT ) = {s  ∀t. s = t|ΣS ⇒ t ∈ πT }
That is, the target guarantee of a source property is that the target has the same source-level
behavior, sprinkled with arbitrary target-level behavior. Conversely, the source-level obligation of
a target property is the aggregate of those source traces all of whose target-level enrichments are
in the target property.
Proof of Secure Compilation. Since RS and RT are very similar, we do not need advanced proof
techniques to prove that the identity compiler from RS to RT is secure. Let us denote with ·↓ that
compiler; for the trace relation ∼ defined above, Theorem 5.3 holds.
Theorem 5.3 ( ·↓ is secure). ·↓ is RTC∼, i.e. ∀P. ∀CT. ∀t. CT [P↓]⇝t ⇒∃CS. ∃s ∼ t. CS [P]⇝s
Proof. ( See theorem extra_target_RTCt in MoreTargetEventsExample.v, mechanizing a
slightly simplified model.) By definition of RTC∼ we need to find a source context and source
trace given a source program, target context and target trace related by compilation and program
semantics: This instantiation is simple since the trace relation is a function from target traces
to source traces, and it is easy to clean target contexts to produce equivalent source context
without target-only events. The proof is a trivial instance of precise, context-based backtranslation
[2, 34, 40, 48], aided by a few straightforward lemmas and where the case of function calls is
guaranteed to terminate by the language. □
5.3 Trace-Relating Robust Preservation of Safety Properties
I/O events are not the only instance of events that compilers consider. Especially in the setting of
secure compilation, where a compartmentalized partial program interacts with a context, interaction
traces are often used [2, 20, 35, 37]. Consider a language analogous to that of the previous section,
where the context C defines a set of functions Fc and the program defines a different set Fp.
Interaction traces (generally) record the control flow of calls between these two sets via actions
that are call f v and ret v [19]. These actions indicate a call to function f with parameter v and a
return with return value v. In case the context calls a function in Fp (or returns to a function in
Fp), the action is decorated with a ? (i.e. those actions are call f v? and ret v?). Dually, the program
calling a function in Fc (or returning to it) generates an action decorated with a ! (i.e. those actions
are call f v! and ret v!).
Patrignani and Garg [37] consider precisely such a setting. Moreover, they define a compiler that
preserves safety properties of source programs (i.e. it is RSC in the sense of Figure 3) by relying on
capability machines. The interesting point, however, is that they also consider source and target
traces to be distinct since the source has bools and nats and the target only has nats.8 Thus, to
8 Technically, their difference on values also encompasses heap locations and capabilities, but we elide that here since this is
sufficient to draw our analogy.
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prove RSC, they rely on a cross-language relation on values, which is scaled to trace actions, and
then scaled point-wise to traces (analogously to what we have done in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 5.2).
Besides defining a relation on traces (which is an instance of ∼), they also define a relation
between source and target safety properties that supports concurrent programs.9 Thus, they really
provide an instantiation of τ that maps all safe source traces to the related target ones. This ensures
that no additional target trace is introduced in the target safety property, and thus the meaning of
the source safety property is preserved by τ .
Their compiler is then proven to generate code that respects τ , so they achieve a variation of
RSCτ . Their proofs are based on standard techniques either for secure compilation (i.e. trace-based
backtranslation [40]) and for correct compilation (i.e. forward/backward simulation [26]).
This indicates how the theory developed here can already be instantiated to encompass existing
results, and that existing proof techniques can be used in order to achieve the secure compilation
criteria we define.
5.4 Trace-Relating Robust Preservation of Hypersafety Properties
Patrignani and Garg [36] study the preservation of hypersafety from the perspective of secure
compilation. Again, their result can be interpreted in our setting. They consider reactive systems,
where trace alphabets are partitioned in input actionsα? and output actionsα !, whose concatenation
generate traces α?α !. We use the same notation as before and indicate such sequences as s and t
respectively. The set of target output actions α ! includes an action
√
that has no source counterpart
(i.e. ∄α? ∼ √), and whose output does not depend on internal state (thus it cannot leak secrets).10
By emitting
√
whenever undesired inputs are fed to a compiled program (e.g., passing a nat when
a bool is expected), hypersafety is preserved (as
√
does not leak secrets) [36].
More formally, they assume a relation on actions ∼ that is total on the source actions and injective.
From there, they define TPC—which here corresponds to an instance of τ—that maps the set of
valid source traces to the set of valid target traces (that now mention
√
) as follows:
TPC (πS) =
{
t
 t ∈ ⋃
n∈N
intn (πS)
}
where int0 (πS) = {t | ∃s ∈ πS ∧ s ∼ t}
intn+1 (πS) = {t | (i) t ≡ t1α?√t2 ∧ (ii) t1t2 ∈ intn (πS) ∧ (iii) undesired (α?)}
where undesired (α?) indicates that α? is an undesired input (intuitively, this is an information
that can be derived from the set of source traces [36]).
Informally, given a set of source traces πS, TPC generates all target traces that are related
(pointwise) to a source trace (case int0). Then (case intn+1), it adds all traces (t) with interleavings
of undesired input α? (point iii) followed by
√
(point i) as long as the interleavings split a trace
t1t2 that has already been mapped (point ii).
TPC is an instance of τ that preserves hypersafety (and therefore, safety), thus our theory can
be instantiated for the preservation of these classes of hyperproperties as well.
6 RELATEDWORK
Throughout this paper we already discussed how our results relate to existing work in correct
compilation [25, 50] and secure compilation [2, 36, 37], so here we focus on other related work.
Compilers where our work could be useful. Wang et al. [53] recently proposed a CompCert variant
that compiles all the way to machine code, and it would be interesting to see if the more realistic
9 They call those safety properties monitors since they focus on safety [46] and indicate s with M and t with M.
10 Technically, they assume a set of
√
actions, but for this analogy a single action suffices.
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model of Example 3.2 could apply. Neis et al. [33] devised the PILS correct compiler, which includes
a variety of intermediate languages, and for which all involved languages have the same traces.
Thus, we can see it as an instance of CC=. Hur and Dreyer [17] devised a correct compiler from
an ML language to assembly using a cross-language logical relation to state their CC theorem.
Unfortunately, they do not have traces, though were one to add them, the logical relation on values
would serve as the basis for the trace relation and therefore their result would attain CC∼.
Some secure compilation results do not rely on traces for their security criterion (instead proving
compiler full abstraction [1, 40]) but they rely on target-level traces as a proof technique [3, 18,
20, 38, 39]. Most of these results consider a cross-language relation that could be lifted to source
traces (were they added), so they can be proved to attain one of the criteria from Figure 3. Other
secure compilation results rely on traces for their security criterion, but they are the same between
source and target language [2]. Since they attain a variation of robustly-safe compilation (RSC in
Figure 3), we can see their compiler as an instance of RSC=.
Generalizations of compiler correctness. The compiler correctness definition of Morris [31] was
already general enough to account for trace relations, since it considered a translation between the
semantics of the source program and that of the compiled program, which he called “decode” in
his diagram, reproduced in Figure 4 (left). And even some of the more recent compiler correctness
definitions preserve this kind of flexibility [41]. Still, whileCC∼ can be seen as an instance of Morris’
[31] definition, we are not aware of any prior work that also looks at how properties are preserved
when the “decode translation” is not identity.
source language
target language target meanings
source meanings
compile
target semantics
decode
source semantics
W
W↓ Z
Z#
T
S
Fig. 4. Morris’s [31] (left) and Melton et al.’s [29] and Sabry and Wadler’s [45] (right) correctness diagrams.
Correct compilation and Galois connections. Melton et al. [29] and Sabry andWadler [45] expressed
a strong variant of compiler correctness using the diagram of Figure 4 (right) [29, 45], which is
almost the same as Morris’ [31]. Intuitively a correct compiler should map source programs to
target ones that parallel the computation steps of the original source programs. More precisely to
prove compiler correctness one has to show the existence of a decompilation map #, that makes the
diagram commute. This problem reduces to showing that the compilation map ↓ is the lower adjoint
of a Galois insertion [29]. Compilation and decompilation maps are thought to be maps between
the sets of terms in the two languages ordered according to the operational semantics. We write
W ≤W ′ ⇐⇒ W ↠W ′, where↠ is the reflexive, transitive closure of the operational semantics
of the language. In case ↓ is the lower adjoint of a Galois connection, it is possible to define a map
on trace properties τ : 2TraceS → 2TraceT such that TPτ holds. Such a τ will be the lower adjoint of a
Galois connection as well. It follows that σ : 2TraceT → 2TraceS , the upper adjoint of τ is uniquely
defined, as well as a relation ∼ ⊆ TraceS × TraceT so that both TPσ and TC∼ hold. We show this
when traces are single values (the results of the computation or ⊥ if the computation diverges)
(Appendix A.1)and when traces are lists or infinite streams of program states (Appendix A.2).
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We extended the property preservation view on compiler correctness to arbitrary trace relations,
and hope that this view will be useful for understanding the guarantees various compilers provide.
An open question is whether given a compiler there is always a best ∼ relation for which this
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compiler is correct. As we mentioned in the introduction, every compiler is CC∼ for some ∼, but
is there always an optimal one? Finally, another interesting direction for future work is studying
whether using the relation to Galois connections allows us to more easily compose trace relations
for different concerns, say for a compiler that has undefined behavior, resource exhaustion, and
side-channels.
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A RELATION TO MELTON ET AL. AND SABRY ANDWADLER
A.1 Traces as values
In this section we assume the semantics of a program to be the set of values the program may
return at the end of its computation, or ⊥ if it does not terminate. Let us denote by V the set of
values of a language, and have ⊥ < V
Trace = {v | v ∈ V ∨ v = ⊥}
and let
τ = λ πS ∈ 2TraceS . {vT | ∃vS ∈ πS. vS↓↠vT}
Assume ↓ has an upper adjoint #, so that the diagram in Figure 4 holds. Although a direct proof of
TPτ is possible, we will instead show that its equivalent characterization, TC∼ immediately follows
from Figure 4. Recall that by Theorem 2.10 the relation ∼⊆ TraceS × TraceT, defined by
vS ∼ vT ⇐⇒ vS↓↠vT
is such that TPτ ⇐⇒ TC∼.
Now let us unfold the definition of TC∼, whereW ⇝ t is replaced byW ↠ t
TC∼ ≡ ∀W ∀vT. W↓↠vT ⇒ ∃vS. vS↓↠vT ∧ W ↠vS
It can be proved by instantiating the existential with vT#.
Observe that Figure 4 does not explicitly provide a proof obligation for W, ensuring that W↓
satisfies some property πT . Such an obligation is instead given by the upper adjoint of τ ,
σ = λ πT ∈ 2TraceT . {vS | ∀vT. vS↓↠vT ⇒ vT ∈ πT }
A.2 Traces as sequences of states
In this section program computations are modeled as sets of finite or infinite sequences of states.
Let Σ be the set of possible states of programs, denote by (Σ∗ + •) ∪ Σω finite sequences of states
terminating with a final/blocking state, together with the infinite ones [10]. The set of all traces is
the subset of (Σ∗ + •) ∪ Σω of sequences that are possible according to the operational semantics,
we write
t ∈ Trace ⇐⇒ ∃W . t =W (t)0W (t)1...
We write W ⇝ t if and only if according to the operational semantics it is possible that W
encounters, in order, all and only the states collected in t , in symbols t =W (t)0W (t)1...
We might drop the (t) if it is clear from the context which trace we refer to.
Define
τ = λ πS ∈ 2TraceS .
{
t = W↓(t)0 W↓(t)1...  ∃s ∈ πS. s = W(s)0W(s)1..}
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By Theorem 2.10 the relation ∼⊆ TraceS × TraceT, defined by s ∼ t ⇐⇒ ∃s. s = W(s)0W(s)1..
is such that TPτ ⇐⇒ TC∼. Like in Appendix A.1 we show that assuming ↓ has an upper adjoint,
then TC∼, and hence TPτ holds.
TC∼ ≡ ∀W ∀t. t = W↓(t)0 W↓(t)1... ⇒ ∃s. s = W(s)0W(s)1...
To show TC∼ follows from Figure 4 we distinguish two cases. If t is finite then we proceed by
induction on its length. If t is infinite we use a coinductive argument. Roughly speaking, for each
state k of the target trace, we know by hypothesis that Wk ↠ (W↓k )#. This reduction happens in
finitely many steps, hence encountering finitely many states that we append to the partial source
trace given at step k − 1.
B PROOFS FOR Section 3.4
Proof for Lemma 3.5 (gensend (·) works). We proceed by induction on τ and τ ′:
τ = N and τ ′ = N By canonicity we have that e = ⟨n, n′⟩
gensend (·) translates that into send (⊢ ⟨n, n′⟩ .1 : N)↓; send (⊢ ⟨n, n′⟩ .2 : N)↓.
By the target expression semantics and Rule Eval-Nn-Send, that produces t = n; n′.
We need to prove that
• e ≡ ⟨n, n′⟩ ↪→∗ ⟨n, n; ⟩ which is trivially true;
• ⟨n, n′⟩ ∼ n; n′, which holds by Rule Trace-Rel-N-N.
τ = τ1 × τ ′1 and τ ′ = τ2 × τ ′2 So by canonicity e =
〈〈
e1, e′1
〉
,
〈
e2, e′2
〉〉
.
By definition of gensend (·):
gensend
( (⊢ 〈〈e1, e′1〉 , 〈e2, e′2〉〉 : τ × τ ′)y)
= gensend
( (⊢ 〈〈e1, e′1〉〉 , 〈e2, e′2〉 .1 : τ )y) ; gensend ( (⊢ 〈〈e1, e′1〉〉 , 〈e2, e′2〉 .2 : τ ′)y)
By assumption we have HP1
gensend
( (⊢ 〈〈e1, e′1〉〉 , 〈e2, e′2〉 .1 : τ )y) ;
gensend
( (⊢ 〈〈e1, e′1〉〉 , 〈e2, e′2〉 .2 : τ ′)y) t1;t2−−−−→ skip
We apply the induction hypothesis and we get
IH-SV1
〈〈
e1, e′1
〉
,
〈
e2, e′2
〉〉
.1 ↪→∗ 〈v1, v′1〉
IH-SV2
〈〈
e1, e′1
〉
,
〈
e2, e′2
〉〉
.2 ↪→∗ 〈v2, v′2〉
IH-SR1
〈
v1, v′1
〉 ∼ t1
IH-SR1
〈
v2, v′2
〉 ∼ t2
We need to prove
• 〈〈e1, e′1〉 , 〈e2, e′2〉〉 ↪→∗ 〈〈v1, v′1〉 , 〈v2, v′2〉〉
By IH-SV1, IH-SV2 and determinism of the semantics.
• 〈〈v1, v′1〉 , 〈v2, v′2〉〉 ∼ t1; t2
This holds by Rule Trace-Rel-M-M with IH-SR1 and IH-SR2, for M =
〈
v1, v′1
〉
and M′ =〈
v2, v′2
〉
.
τ = N and τ ′ = τ1 × τ2 Analogous to the other cases, by IH and Rule Trace-Rel-N-M.
τ = τ1 × τ2 and τ ′ = N Analogous to the other cases, by IH and Rule Trace-Rel-M-N. □
Proof for Lemma 3.6 ( (·)↓ is correct for expressions). Trivial induction on the typing deriva-
tion of e. □
Proof for Theorem 3.7 ( (·)↓ is correct). By definition we need to prove that
∀c, t. if (⊢ c)↓ ⇝ t then ∃s ∼ t and c ⇝ Q
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We proceed by induction on the typing derivation of c.
Base. c = skip Trivial, by Rule Trace-Rel-Empty as no trace is emitted.
Inductive. c = c; c′ By IH.
c = if e then c else c′ By Lemma 3.6 ( (·)↓ is correct for expressions) and IH.
c = send e By HP we have that HPQ (⊢ send e)↓ t−→ skip.
We can then apply Lemma 3.5 (gensend (·) works) with HPQ and we have HPV v ∼ t and
HPS e ↪→∗ v.
By definition of (·)↓ and of⇝ we need to prove that send t v−−→ skip and v ∼ t.
The former holds by HPS and Rule Eval-Np-Send.
The latter holds by HPV. □
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